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1. Introduction  
Are social impact bonds (SIBs) an ethical way to deliver social care? In this paper, I develop a 
consequentialist framework for evaluating the ethical status of SIBs. SIBs represent a new 
form of marketized social intervention (Bridges Fund Management 2017) and it is this 
attempt to create markets for social care that yields the potential for ethical problems. The 
framework I develop extends work by Debra Satz (2010) on the ethics of marketization by 
incorporating issues which are specific to SIBs, providing a more nuanced view of issues 
related to decision-making, consent and potential harm in the contractual setting of a SIB. It 
identifies four criteria for their ethical evaluation: informational asymmetry, power 
imbalance, generation of individual harm and gen- eration of societal harm, all of which 
potentially impair social welfare.  
The marketization of social care using SIBs has a relatively short history. The first SIB, which 
focused on reducing recidivism in a prison population in Peterborough in the UK, was 
developed in March 2010 and, by 2016, 61 SIBs in total had been initiated worldwide (Floyd 
2017). In order to analyse the ethical issues associated with SIBs, it is important to 
understand the structure of such schemes and how they differ from previous forms of social 
care delivery (Gustafsson-Wright, Gardiner, and Putcha 2015). SIBs differ from earlier 
models of public-private provision or pay-by-results delivery contracts in two important 
ways. First, they are intended to transfer financial risk to the private sector by sourcing 
upfront financing from external investors (Social Finance 2016)
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 and, second, SIBs generally 
provide additional non-core social services rather than serving as substitutes for existing 
services. As such, they are often used as a means of testing new approaches to solving social 
problems. For an excellent review of the literature on SIBs, see Fraser et al. 2016.  
It has been argued that the marketization of social care using SIBs is justified because of 
their potential benefits (Mulgan et al. 2011; Social Finance 2016; Stoesz 2014). In particular, 
it is argued that SIBs enable innovation in tackling persistent social problems and generate 
economies through scaling and the use of effective performance manage- ment (Gustafsson-
Wright, Gardiner, and Putcha 2015; Edmiston and Nicholls 2018; Floyd 2017; Social Finance 
2016), which results in savings to the public purse and improved social outcomes (Big 
Society Capital 2014).  
Some studies, though, have questioned the accuracy of claims about the purported benefits 
(Ronicle et al. 2014) with some scholars claiming that these are “often hypothetical and 
poorly” evidenced (Edmiston and Nicholls 2018, 61). Others argue that poorly constructed 
schemes incentivise service providers to target the easiest outcomes at the expense of 
addressing hard cases or to overstate effectiveness (Warner 2013). Others have questioned 
the “hype” regarding SIBs and whether specific SIB structures are truly necessary for 
achieving these benefits (Floyd and Gregory 2015).  
Critical scholars have questioned the cultural effects on civil society of the market- ization or 
financialization of the public sector (Dowling 2016; Dowling and Harvie 2014; Hood 1991; 
Humphrey, Miller, and Scapens 1993; Le Grand 2010; Kurunmäki and Miller 2011; Nicholls 
2009; Sinclair et al. 2014). These concerns, which include the colonisation of public sector 
values by the corporate sector and the misalignment of incentives between civil society 
organisations and business interests (McHugh et al. 2013; Nicholls and Murdock 2012), raise 
serious ethical questions regarding SIBs.  
This paper develops a new framework for assessing the ethical status of SIBs by extending 
and partially modifying the framework provided by Satz (2010). It draws on evidence from 
SIBs that address problems of recidivism, education, homelessness and long-term healthcare 
to identify the salient differences between the characteristics of ethical markets advanced 
by Satz and those which pertain to SIBs. In doing so, it suggests key characteristics of SIB 
structures which may render them unethical either in principle or in practice.  
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I briefly introduce and justify the use of a 
consequentialist approach to evaluating the ethical status of SIBs drawing on work by Satz 
(2010). In Section 3, I consider the applicability of Satz’s framework to the market for social 
care provided using SIBs and extend her framework to accommodate the particular 
characteristics observed in practice. Section 4 briefly considers the difference between the 
ethics of markets for SIBs and the ethics in markets for SIBs. Finally, Section 5 offers some 
concluding remarks and suggests possibilities for further research.  
2. Why use consequentialism to evaluate the ethics of SIBs?  
The cost-benefit arguments frequently used to justify the development of SIBs represent a 
form of consequentialist reasoning
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which is consistent with mainstream economic analysis. 
Cost-benefit analysis forms the core of much of the reasoning in political decision-making, 
and thus explicitly or implicitly invokes consequentialism: the merit of a course of action is 
evaluated with reference to the outcomes it produces. This makes consequentialism the 
natural method for assessing SIBs. Many reports by government agencies and SIB 
intermediaries evaluate SIBs by referring to their costs and benefits (Bridges Fund 
Management 2017; HM Government 2014; Rangan and Chase 2015; The Whitehouse 2013). 
This can be seen in a report by Social Finance on the benefits of the Peterborough SIB which 
states:  
“Successful rehabilitation will deliver benefits to society and reduce public spending on the 
prison system. In simple terms, fewer offenders will commit less crime requiring fewer 
prisons costing less money.” (Social Finance 2010, 1)  
Perhaps the best argument in favour of some version of consequentialism against a 
deontological competitor which “appeals to conformity with certain rules of duty” (Smart 
and Williams 1973, 5) is that only consequentialism is truly compatible with a fundamental 
commitment to, and respect for, the welfare of persons. For, as Smart and Williams (1973) 
noted, although most of the requirements of a system of deontological ethics will coincide 
with human welfare, there will be instances where the requirements of duty will in fact 
conflict with human welfare. Smart notes that a deontologist is subject to prima facie 
“heartlessness”, apparently preferring “abstract conformity to a rule to the prevention of 
avoidable human suffering” (Smart and Williams 1973, 6). I take consequentialism to be 
appropriate for evaluating the ethics of SIBs, since there is a natural co-alignment of 
objectives of SIBs and consequentialist reasoning: SIBs are primarily concerned with 
enhancing the welfare of persons through the use of market mechanisms. Other moral 
frameworks, such as deontological approaches, may simply reject the marketization of social 
care out of principle without sufficiently scrutinizing its purported merits. If a 
consequentialist analysis suggests that ethical concerns exist in SIB structures, however, 
they should be taken seriously.  
Within the field of moral philosophy, Debra Satz employs a consequentialist frame- work to 
provide an insightful critique of marketization, which is particularly appealing for use in this 
study because it addresses issues that are relevant to SIBs. It considers the vulnerability of 
market participants and the potential restrictions powerful profit- seeking market 
participants can impose on others regarding access to healthcare, employment or education 
(Satz 2010, 5). In her book, Why some things should not be for sale: The moral limits of 
markets, Satz analyzes the ethical status of markets using four criteria which specify when a 
market is “noxious”, by which she means that it is fundamentally unethical. Satz argues that 
if any one of these criteria is satisfied, the market will necessarily be unethical in principle.  
Two of the criteria proposed by Satz (2010) identify the characteristics of noxious markets, 
specifically, a lack of agency and the vulnerability of participants. First, Satz (2010) argues 
that agency requires a participant to be fully informed about the likely outcomes of their 
market engagement to facilitate appropriate decision-making. If information asymmetries 
exist between participants, so that some participants lack agency, markets will be unethical. 
Satz’s second condition specifies that a power imbalance between participants is associated 
with unethical markets, because of the possibility of exploitation. The third and fourth 
criteria proposed by Satz (2010) specify market outcomes which reflect harm to individuals 
or harm to society. These outcomes generally refer to longer term negative welfare effects 
for particular groups in society or even the undermining of civil society or democracy. Satz’s 
criteria form the basis for the development of an ethical framework for evaluating SIBs.  
3. Developing a framework to evaluate the ethical status of SIBs  
In what follows, I consider the applicability of Satz’s criteria for evaluating SIBs, and propose 
modifications based on evidence from SIBs in UK and US settings (listed in the appendix) to 
develop a framework for evaluating the ethical status of SIBs. It should also be noted that, 
whereas Satz’s framework refers to the ethics of markets, in Section 4, I will also consider 
ethical issues that arise in SIB markets. These refer to the existence of unethical practices in 
SIB markets which are nevertheless ethical in principle.  
3.1. The information asymmetry criterion  
According to Satz’s first criterion, ethical concerns arise if market participants lack agency: 
that is, if they are poorly-informed with the result that they are not be capable of making 
rational decisions. Similar informational concerns have been highlighted by social welfare 
theorists with respect to the marketization of healthcare (Arrow 1963, 951). However, Satz’s 
information asymmetry criterion needs modification if it is to be applied to the case of SIBs. 
The idealized market transaction described by Satz is a simple two-person commercial 
interaction, such as the trade of a good or service between an individual purchaser and a 
vendor, whereas SIBs are more complex, with multiple market actors (Hipp and Warner 
2008). As Warner (2013, 310) has stated, “[t]he mix of actors involved in SIBs raises the 
complexity beyond simple contracting to a network of actors connected by a series of 
contracts and performance payment schemes.” Additionally, in contrast to Satz’s 
framework, the financial incentives of SIB investors are often unknown to the subjects of 
interventions, as is the fact that they serve to generate profit. Furthermore, information 
regarding interventions may be complex, uncertain and contested (Fox and Albertson 2011) 
and the outcomes of interventions may be inaccessible for those without clinical knowledge. 
What counts as a suitably informed market participant is thus not adequately addressed by 
the information asymmetry criterion in the Satz model which must be extended to address 
the informational status of subjects, service providers, intermediaries and investors 
connected with a SIB.  
Two further informational issues require a modification to be made to the Satz framework if 
it is to be relevant for SIBs. The first concerns evidence regarding the effectiveness of an 
intervention, which may be unclear, and experts may disagree about its efficacy. The NYC 
Able SIB,
3 for example, aimed to reduce recidivism of prisoners at Riker’s Island in the US 
using a method known as Moral Reconation Therapy © (MRT).  
The effectiveness of MRT is contested as conflicting evidence exists: one meta-study shows a 
statistically significant but small effect for 33 studies including 30,259 partici- pants 
(Ferguson and Wormith 2013), but the overall picture is mixed, with other studies finding 
MRT to be ineffective. An early investigation highlighted a number of concerns about the 
validity of the MRT approach (Clark 1985) and more recent work has found no significant 
difference in recidivism between the treatment and control groups for 375 offenders who 
participated in MRT (Behrens 2009, iv). Furthermore, the effectiveness of the intervention 
may not be known if a SIB is used to test an innovative approach or apply an established 
intervention to a new population, as was the case for the NYC Able Project. In these cases, 
informational asymmetry is ethically problematic if financial incentives drive the choice to 
proceed with an intervention that would otherwise not be initiated given the evidence 
available.  
A second, more serious informational deficiency exists when information must be withheld 
from one or more of the parties to the SIB in order for the intervention to be effective. The 
Satz framework presumes that all parties are aware of the profit-seeking nature of the 
market transaction. By contrast, a SIB using a randomized control trial may need to withhold 
information from subjects and delivery staff concerning their membership of either the 
intervention group or the control group. Furthermore, it may be necessary to withhold 
information about the profit-generating nature of the inter- vention from delivery staff to 
enable the development of trust between them and the subject, as it has been noted that 
“the introduction of a profit incentive may negatively change the relationship between the 
service providers and beneficiaries” (UNDP 2018). In the UK, an evaluation report on the Fair 
Chance Fund SIB highlights the importance for the key worker of winning the trust of the 
subject, with one interviewee quoted as saying that the keyworker was, “someone I could 
talk to straight away which was kind of nice. I felt like I could trust him quite soon . . .” 
(Department for Communities and Local Government 2017, 68). On a consequentialist 
account, the generation of trust between the subject and the keyworker during the process 
of referral may justify withholding information about the profit-seeking objectives of the SIB 
if this is neces- sary for achieving participation, and this participation ultimately enhances 
the welfare of the subject. If Satz’s information criterion is to be applied to SIBs, it is thus in 
need of modification to reflect any failure to inform subjects about the profit-seeking nature 
of the intervention, except where ignorance of this fact is essential for the success of the 
intervention.  
Thus far, I have argued that the Satz framework requires some modification to ensure that 
all parties to a SIB are informed of all decision-relevant information unless that information 
would prejudice the result of an experimental intervention or damage relationships between 
staff at service providers and subjects.  
3.2. The power imbalance criterion  
A power imbalance within a market setting presents a significant ethical concern for SIBs 
and may be analyzed either at the level of the individual or the level of the organization. Satz 
argues that no individual participating in the market should have significantly more power 
than any other, because “[a] market exchange based in desperation, humiliation or begging 
or whose terms of remediation involve bondage or servitude is not an exchange between 
equals” (Satz 2010, 93). An unethical market will, in these cases, be characterized by power 
imbalances between participants, which may result in a subject having no real choice about 
whether or not to enter into a transaction and potentially being subject to exploitation 
(Ferguson 2016).  
According to Satz’s power criterion, a SIB would be unethical if subjects were not capable of 
giving informed consent regarding their participation. This raises concerns with SIBs, 
because many, if not all of them, act upon individuals who do not possess full autonomy, for 
example due to their incarceration or limited cognitive ability. Although some SIBs do give 
subjects the choice of opting out of programmes (Nicholls and Tomkinson 2013, 19), it is not 
clear that the subjects are capable of giving informed consent, whether they are prisoners, 
individuals from a disadvantaged background, individuals with long-term health problems or 
children. A modification to the power imbalance criterion is therefore needed for 
application to SIBs.  
In some SIBs, consent is obtained from subjects: at the Peterborough SIB, for example, 
participation by inmates was voluntary.
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By contrast, for the NYC Able Project, participation 
was mandatory for all detainees of 16–18 years attending school,5 while in Riker’s Island all 
selected inmates participated because the developers of MRT claimed it was effective only if 
its application was mandatory (Little and Robinson 1988). In the case of the New York State 
Increasing Employment SIB, participation was voluntary in principle, but it constituted a 
“special condition of parole”, with the result that participation was not purely voluntary in 
practice.
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Even if a SIB permits opting-out in principle, according to Satz’s power imbalance criterion it 
would be unethical if powerful participants persuaded vulnerable subjects to participate if 
this was disadvantageous for them. In several SIBs, authority figures, such as medical 
professionals, advise vulnerable subjects, and the power imbalance generates scope for such 
ethical issues. UK healthcare SIBs have employed “social prescribing” to address social 
factors such as poor diet, inactivity and social isolation, which are associated with long-term 
health conditions (Alderwick et al. 2018). Patients are referred by general practitioners (GP) 
to a link worker who connects them to local organizations offering social, sporting and other 
activities. A potential concern is that a vulnerable subject is likely to agree to whatever the 
GP recommends, even if they feel uncomfortable about social prescribing rather than other 
therapeutic interventions. However, unlike the Satz criterion in which authority can corrupt 
and lead to noxious outcomes, the relationship between the GP and patient differs 
structurally from the relationship between the purchaser and vendor of a good or service in 
a simple market. The clinician does not benefit financially from the referral, and is, in any 
case, constrained by codes of professional conduct and medical ethics. Consequently, the 
Satz power criterion requires some modification for application to a SIB setting to reflect the 
fact that not all actors are necessarily self-interested and that the mere existence of a power 
imbalance need not generate an ethical concern in principle.  
A power imbalance may also exist at the organizational level within a SIB structure. Power 
imbalances between commissioners, service providers, intermediaries and inves- tors may 
arise due to their different skill sets. It has been argued, for example, that investors may 
have stronger financial skills, enabling them to structure SIBs in ways which serve their own 
objectives at the expense of others (Warner 2013). This is  
particularly important if investors are contractually permitted to select and deselect service 
providers, as was the case for the UK Peterborough SIB (Warner 2015) as they may be 
incentivised to select or deselect particular service providers for financial reasons.  
The ethical problem of exploitation may also arise if the bargaining power of the investor 
exceeds that of the commissioner. In the Utah SIB, it was argued that the investors 
(Goldman Sachs and the J.B. and M.K. Pritzker Family Foundation) struc- tured the payment 
criteria in a way that enabled them to receive excessive returns. According to a New York 
Times article:  
“Goldman said its investment had helped almost 99 percent of the Utah children it was tracking avoid 
special education in kindergarten. The bank received a payment for each of those children...The big 
problem, researchers say, is that even well-funded preschool programs – and the Utah program was 
not well funded – have been found to reduce the number of students needing special education by, at 
most, 50 percent. Most programs yield a reduction of closer to 10 or 20 percent.” (Popper 2015)  
Given the empirical findings from previous interventions, the claims made by Goldman Sachs 
should be viewed, at the very least, with some degree of scepticism. This case illustrates that 
organizational power imbalances can impinge on the ethical status of a SIB.  
To summarise, the power imbalance criterion should reflect both the power relations 
between individuals involving operational relationships and between organizations, such as 
service providers, commissioners and investors, in their contracting activities. Parties to a 
SIB should not abuse their power over vulnerable subjects or exploit local communities by 
structuring unfair contracts.  
3.3 The individual harm criterion  
In addition to Satz’s requirements about the agency and vulnerability of market participants, 
she also stipulates particular market outcomes relating to harm to indivi- duals, which must 
be avoided if a market is to be considered ethical. Satz argues that commercial self-interest 
may lead to the structuring of markets which preserve the societal status quo in a way that 
damages individuals’ welfare. Decision-making in SIBs may be driven by the incentives of 
private social investors and social finance inter- mediaries whose interests have been 
identified as “diverse and wide-ranging” (Edmiston and Nicholls 2018, 73). The resulting 
decisions may then be incompatible with the provision of care to those who most need it 
(Lowe and Evans 2016) and may incentivise social organisations to focus on the easiest 
targets or “shape their provision around the terms of the contract rather than the needs of 
the client” (McHugh et al. 2013, 250). It should also be noted that SIBs are not structured to 
compensate subjects for negative outcomes or groups of individuals for negative 
externalities generated.  
The financial pressure to enrol a subject into an intervention may result in unethical 
outcomes. In this regard, an evaluation report of the UK DWP Innovation Fund SIB, reveals 
that, on occasion, decisions concerning subject selection were driven by “economic 
necessity”, that is they were primarily motivated by the requirement to sign up a certain 
number of subjects (Insite Research and Consulting 2014, 46). Non-financial incentive- 
misalignment in SIBs can also generate harm. The same report states that teachers were 
likely to select the more disruptive students for participation in the scheme (in order to have 
them removed from the classroom) rather than selecting students who were most likely to 
benefit (Insite Research and Consulting 2014). A member of the delivery staff of the SIB is 
quoted as saying: “We often get the ones that cause the teachers the most problems, but 
they’re not always the ones that are the most needy” (Insite Research and Consulting 2014, 
43). Some coaches on the scheme stated that less disruptive children were often passed 
over for selection even though they suffered from “low confidence and poor self-esteem” 
and “were at risk of slipping through the net unnoticed on the way to becoming NEET [not in 
education, employment or training]” (ibid: 43). This evidence relating to the problems 
associated with non-financial incen- tives suggests that Satz’s individual harm criterion 
should be modified for SIBs to specify that poor outcomes, and hence unethical markets, 
may result from misaligned incentives. Where such incentive misalignments can be 
addressed operationally, for example by requiring referrals to be made by a third-party 
educational specialist, they can be viewed as pertaining to ethical activities in a SIB market 
rather than to the ethics of such markets.  
Potential harm may also result from a SIB if a denial of access to social care results from the 
need to demonstrate the effectiveness of an intervention in order to trigger success 
payments to private investors. This may be exacerbated by the power imbalance between 
the financial stakeholders and the subjects who have no effective voice in a discourse that 
may prioritise effective outcomes primarily for reasons of profit generation. Randomized 
control trials (RCTs), considered the gold standard for eval- uating therapeutic interventions, 
are used in some SIB schemes, such as the South Carolina SIB, to establish effectiveness by 
comparing the outcomes for a group which receives an intervention to those of a control 
group. RCTs have been identified as ethically problematic in medical trials, in particular 
where the control group is denied access to treatment even after its effectiveness has 
become evident to the service provider (Worrall 2008). SIBs may also generate harm by 
focusing on cost savings, which can also result in a denial of service to potentially vulnerable 
and needy individuals. As Tse & Warner (2018, 10) have argued, “tying SIB payments to 
special education can create a financial incentive to keep services away from children who 
need them”. Satz’s framework thus needs to be modified to take account of any denial of 
service to needy recipients that results from a requirement to demonstrate either 
effectiveness or cost savings by a SIB.  
A further modification to the individual harm criterion is also required for cases where 
organization-level incentives may cause implicit harm by delivering interventions that 
provide only superficial or short-term benefits, rather than effecting fundamental social 
change. An organization may be willing to invest in interventions which attenu- ate negative 
effects on individuals of social needs without addressing the core social drivers of those 
needs. The long-term financial incentive of a business which depends on serving those who 
suffer from social deprivation is not to eliminate the root causes of that social deprivation, if 
this would undermine its business model. As Lake (2015) has argued, SIBs may fail to address 
the fundamental, structural problems relating to economic welfare and social inclusion:  
 “Most disadvantaged in the resulting policy practice are the client-recipients of the 
behavioral interventions provided through the policy mechanism, whose behavioral fail- ures 
are targeted as the problem to be rectified while the underlying structural and institutional 
determinants of life chances in a financialized society remain intact.” (Lake 2016, 15)  
In the case of the NYC Able SIB, for example, the use of MRT to reduce reoffending rates 
focused on the moral and psychological failings of the individual prisoner and did not 
address the broader economic and sociological factors which may have driven the 
behaviours observed. The intervention may thus be viewed as a distraction from the real 
work needed to alleviate the social problems that stem from economic and social inequality. 
The individual harm criterion thus also needs to be modified to take into account the 
incentive of investors to maintain the socio-economic status quo.  
3.4. The societal harm criterion  
Satz argues that harmful outcomes for society will result if the market shapes indivi- duals’ 
preferences or capacities in a way that is detrimental to social welfare in the future. Satz’s 
societal harm criterion requires modification for a SIB setting to reflect the fact that a SIB 
may be classified as unethical if it harms society by prioritising short term objectives at the 
expense of long-term social welfare (Lake 2015), even if this prioritization confers an 
improvement in short-term welfare. In addition, SIBs may cause structural harm to a 
community by financializing social care and transferring resources away from the local 
authority without securing future funding in exchange.  
The marketization of certain services may lead to unethical outcomes if long-term incentives 
of private investors are inconsistent with long-term societal objectives. In healthcare and 
prisons for example, markets will viewed as noxious if commercial investors take legal, yet 
unethical, actions to generate shareholder value. SIBs have been likened to private prisons 
in the US (Baliga 2013) and some scholars have argued that private providers have lobbied 
for increased rates of incarceration and the length- ening of custodial sentences (Sarabi and 
Bender 2000) while others are more agnostic about the direction of causality but 
acknowledge the “incarceration binge” in the US that accompanied the rise in private 
prisons (Selman and Leighton 2010).  
The fact that SIBs have allowed investors and intermediaries from the private sector to 
dictate some elements of care delivery, in particular, performance management, raises a 
concern about the possibility of SIBs generating societal harm. The UK government explicitly 
acknowledges the need for investors to control the delivery of a SIB because of the risk they 
are bearing and has suggested various ways this can be achieved, such as taking a seat on 
the board of the service delivery provider or “replacing providers if outcomes aren’t being 
achieved” (HM Government 2012). The potential for the privatisation of social care provision 
raises potential ethical concerns due to the divergent interests of state and for-profit 
organizations.  
In order to assess the extent to which societal harm may result from SIBs, it is necessary to 
be aware of the trade-off between the long-term costs and benefits of SIBs for local 
communities. Financialization of social care offers potential benefits to local government, 
such as establishing future funding opportunities for certain care priorities. However, in 
some cases financialization may result in the exploitative use of local resources with no 
compensating benefits. The likely impact of a SIB on long term societal outcomes will 
depend on the relative bargaining power of local authorities and external financial 
stakeholders, and also on the localized political setting. As Shortall and Warner (2010) have 
argued, in European contexts, social inclusion is viewed as an important goal whereas, in the 
US, “social inclusion has no currency in policy debates” and a focus on economic 
competitiveness is paramount. Different outcomes of financialization of social care provision 
would be expected in these different political settings, some of which may cause societal 
harm.  
Even within the US, the extent to which financialization through SIBs exploits local 
communities or enables them to achieve long term goals may vary between different 
settings as shown for the case of US early childcare SIBs (Tse and Warner 2018). In that 
study, the authors highlight the different outcomes observed for three SIBs in South 
Carolina, Utah and Chicago, which they attribute to the local political setting. In the Utah 
SIB, state legislation capped the return to the investors, thereby limiting possible financial 
exploitation although the evaluation metrics were never- theless criticized (Popper, 2015). 
By contrast, the Chicago SIB did not cap the return and in fact structured returns to the 
investor over a much longer term than for the other two SIBs, thereby dramatically 
increasing the transfer of wealth from the local community to the investors. Finally, it was 
shown that the South Carolina SIB was able to advance social inclusion through the use of a 
rural outreach program, thereby generating social welfare gains for the local community. 
These varied outcomes for long term social welfare were shaped by the political setting.  
The evidence from SIBs suggests that Satz’s societal harm criterion needs to be extended to 
accommodate the long-term benefits and costs to local communities associated with the 
financialization of social care, taking into account the extent to which the political and 
institutional setting will affect the risk of exploitation. SIBs risk causing societal harm when 
the dominant local discourse is economic and local commissioners fail to obtain long-term 
benefits for the community, such as funding opportunities. The increasing use of SIBs in 
these types of contexts also risks perpetuating and reinforcing an economic discourse at the 
expense of a focus on civil society values. Thus, the modification required for the applica- 
tion of Satz’s societal harm criterion to SIBs is an acknowledgement of the subtle and 
different ways in which a SIB can generate welfare and the relevance of the political and 
institutional context in which the SIB is located.  
3.5. A modified framework for the ethical evaluation of SIBs  
Having proposed a number of significant modifications of Satz’s criteria, I now summarise 
the revised ethical framework for SIBs in Table 1 below.  
 
The existence of any of these conditions would, I argue, render a SIB market unethical. A 
failure of agency (informational asymmetry) can occur where subjects cannot be fully 
informed about the effectiveness of a therapy or the financial incentives of other parties. 
The marketization of social care also risks being unethical if the financial benefits of the SIB 
to investors and service providers conflict with actions that serve the needs of vulnerable 
subjects. If an imbalance exists between the service provider and client, subjects may not be 
capable of giving informed consent and have no voice in the process in which they are 
participating. Alternatively, unethical consequences may arise due to a power imbalance 
between investors and commissioners if their experience and skills in structuring contracts 
differ resulting in potentially unfair contracts.  
In terms of market outcomes, harm to individuals may result from financial incentives that 
are at odds with the needs of subjects. In addition, an unethical transfer of resources from 
the commissioner to the external investor may arise if the SIB inter- vention is superficial 
and fails to address the societal drivers of social problems. In other cases, resources may be 
extracted by private investors where SIBs fail to achieve the objectives of local communities 
such as long-term financing (Tse and Warner 2018).  
The revised ethical framework for SIBs sets out the potential ethical pitfalls which must be 
avoided if SIB contracts are to provide a way to address the ethics of markets for social care. 
If any of these conditions exists, the market cannot be ethical in principle. However, even 
ensuring that none of these criteria is met does not guarantee a SIB market that is free of 
ethical problems.  
4. The ethics of markets versus the ethics in markets  
Unethical practices can be observed even in SIB markets which are ethical, which include the 
‘gaming’ of results and failing to seek informed consent when it is possible to do so. The 
provision of misleading information or gaming in order to demonstrate effectiveness has 
been identified as a recurrent problem in SIBs (Lowe and Wilson 2015). A recent OECD 
report into SIBs stated: “There is a fear that this strong focus on results can change the 
public service ethos or lead to a narrow mechanical determinism in service delivery. It may 
be possible to game the results by selecting clients that are easiest to reach (‘cream 
skimming’) while leaving those that would be most expensive without service (‘parking’)” 
(OECD 2016,16 paragraph 47). Although the report found no evidence of such gaming 
activity in the two SIBs it analysed (one of which was the Peterborough SIB), it 
acknowledged that placing incentives on social organisations to demonstrate the 
achievement of specific targets might have unwanted consequences, since “[f]ocusing too 
much on narrow metrics may lead to unintended consequences and gaming in fields where 
cooperation and holistic approaches may be required” (20). As discussed earlier, the Utah 
pre-school education SIB paid the investor for reductions to the number of children 
requiring special needs services, but it has been claimed subsequently that the predicted 
levels of special needs requirements were initially overstated, thereby generating an unethi- 
cal return for the investor (Popper 2015). Furthermore, the use of binary outcome measures 
rather than frequency measures (that are preferred by clinicians) has been highlighted as a 
dishonest way of demonstrating higher effectiveness (McHugh et al. 2013).  
A second problem of unethical actions in markets arises if service providers fail to obtain 
informed consent when it would be possible to do so. For some subjects, it may not be 
possible to obtain informed consent directly because of their age or cognitive ability, but an 
alternative is to seek approval of an adult carer before a child is enrolled into an intervention 
group. In the UK DWP Innovation Fund SIB, the selection of subjects aged between 14 and 
15 years took place within a school environ- ment. Recognizing that under-age subjects may 
not have been sufficiently knowledge- able about the effects of the intervention and given 
the power imbalance between teachers and students, a report evaluating the Innovation 
Fund SIB states:  
“It was also clear that the school context assisted recruitment onto some projects because it was able 
somewhat to blur the voluntary nature of the programme.” (Insite Research and Consulting 2014, 42)  
The decision to “blur” the voluntary nature of the project is problematic with respect to the 
requirement that informed consent should be obtained. The report then continues by citing 
a delivery manager who states:  
“The letter that the schools send out to parents . . . it’s about ‘your child has been chosen to 
take part in this exciting programme’ . . . it’s what is called implied consent – if they don’t 
come back and say ‘no’ then we go ahead . . .” (ibid, page 42)  
This interview data from the Insite report demonstrates that explicit consent from children 
or their parents was not always obtained.  
Gaming and the failure to obtain informed consent are not necessary consequences of the 
marketization of care and do not in principle undermine the use of SIBs to deliver social 
care, but if they go unchecked, they will result in the SIB being unethical in practice. This 
failure of ethics in markets, can potentially be addressed through con- tractual means or 
through regulation to improve the quality and reliability of outcomes reporting.  
5. Conclusion  
SIBs offer a tantalising opportunity for generating improvements in the allocational and 
operational efficiency of social care provision and can in principle transfer financial risk to 
private sector investors, yet they also raise significant ethical concerns. Using a 
consequentialist approach which draws on work by Satz (2010) on noxious markets, I 
developed a framework for evaluating the ethics of marketized social care using SIBs. This 
evaluative framework was informed by evidence from SIBs in the UK and US that have 
addressed issues of recidivism, education, homelessness, and healthcare. All four criteria 
contained in Satz’s original framework for evaluating the ethics of markets were modified to 
render them applicable to SIBs.  
I argued that SIB markets are not unethical in principle, but that many SIBs are nevertheless 
at high risk of being unethical because they are characterised by informa- tion asymmetries, 
power imbalances and financial incentive structures, any of which can lead to a failure of 
informed consent, poor decision-making by vulnerable indivi- duals, unfair contractual 
arrangements or a denial of service. In the longer term, unfair bargaining power between 
local authorities and investors may result in the extraction of local resources without 
compensating future benefits such as increased revenue streams. These long-term 
outcomes will be influenced by variations in the political and cultural contexts in which the 
SIB operates. A trade-off thus exists between the benefits conferred by SIBs and the 
inherent risk that they will lead to noxious markets for social care. Requiring formal 
oversight of SIBs and demanding public accountability by investors, commissioners and 
service providers may provide a means of alleviating some of these ethical concerns, 
although the risk that SIBs generate societal harm is particularly difficult to address. Future 
research could helpfully address the question of how best to regulate SIBs to minimise the 
risk that they are unethical.  
I also acknowledged that, even when markets for social care are ethical in principle, some 
SIB participants may nevertheless engage in practices which are unethical, such as the 
gaming of results and the failure to comply with requirements for obtaining informed 
consent. These practices, I argued, do not necessarily undermine the ethical status of the 
market overall and should be addressed through contractual or regulatory measures to re-
align the incentives of the different parties and improve accountability to all stakeholders.  
The SIB market is still relatively undeveloped, and it is to be expected that more 
sophisticated forms of SIBs will soon emerge. Future research could usefully refine the 
framework developed here to incorporate new issues that arise as the SIB market matures 
and to reflect the specificities of the geographical and political contexts in which a SIB 
operates.  
Notes  
1. It should be noted, however, that at least 3 UK SIBs have been funded by the provider 
organisation and have received no upfront external investment (Floyd 2017, 5, footnote 22).  
2. Many subtle distinctions exist between different versions of consequentialism in the 
literature; however, for the purposes of this paper, these subtleties can be ignored as my 
intention is to simply use the relatively straightforward cost-benefit analysis employed by 
advocates of SIBs to reflect upon the value of SIBs themselves as a method for achieving  
public policy objectives in general.  
3. Urban Institute (2013). https://pfs.urban.org/pfs-project-fact-sheets/content/nyc-able-  
project-incarcerated-youth.  
4. http://bssec.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/SF_Peterborough_SIB1.pdf.  
5. https://payforsuccess.org/project/nyc-able-project-incarcerated-youth.  
6. https://payforsuccess.org/project/new-york-state-increasing-employment-and-improving-  
public-safety#.  
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Appendix  




Youth offending Education/employment Youth employment Youth homelessness Education 
Education 
Education 
Social Prescribing  
Country Name  
UK Peterborough One Service US NYC Able (Riker’s Island) 
US Mass Juvenile Justice (2014) UK DWP Innovation Fund  
US NY Increasing Employment and Improving Public Safety UK UK: air Chance Fund 
US School Readiness Initiative (Utah) 
US Child-parent center pay for success (Chicago)  
US Nurse-family partnership pay for success (South Carolina) UK Ways to Wellness  
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